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Introduction 
Antitrust law rests on the philosophy that the economy functions best when markets thrive and when 
purchasers, armed with information, are able to make decisions that yield both quality and value. 
Thus, the overarching aim of antitrust law is to advance free and open markets in which competition 
can flourish. But health care is a market not quite like any other, distinguished by the special 
relationship that governs patients and health professionals, and the asymmetry of information that 
has historically characterized this relationship. 1 While consumers are far more knowledgeable today, 
the roles and duties of health professionals in society remain special ones, not easily amenable to 
sweeping change, despite ongoing calls for reform. 2 Thus, antitrust law and health care have had an 
uneasy relationship for decades. Even though medical care itself represents the single largest part of 
the economy, it is different from buying televisions, and how to adapt health care buying and selling 
to the law of markets has proven to be a complex undertaking. 3  
1 Arrow KJ, “Reflections on the Reflections,” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 26
(5), 2001. 
2 A Dose of Competition, Washington: Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2004. http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/health_care/204694.htm (accessed June 
22, 2009). 
3 Rosenblatt R, Law S, and Rosenbaum S, Law and the American Health Care System, New 
York: Foundation Press, 1997; Rosenblatt R, Rosenbaum S, and Frankford D, Law and the 
American Health Care System: 2001-2002 Supplement, New York: Foundation Press, 2001. 
This policy brief is the first of two to address antitrust considerations that arise in health system 
transformation aimed at producing greater clinical integration and greater levels of information about 
the quality and cost of care. The second policy brief will discuss the implications of several recent 
Federal Trade Commission rulings on physician joint contracting to achieve clinical integration and 
greater health information accountability. These rulings have significant implications for growing 
efforts, as part of health reform, to create entities known as accountable care organizations. 
It is evident that information sharing alone is not the culprit—the antitrust problems arise when 
competitors jointly use the information to attempt to control the price within a particular geographic 
and product market. Thus, entities that convene stakeholders, provide extensive information about 
cost and quality outcomes within the market, present information on innovations in health care 
organization and payment, educate and inform their members, and provide technical support to test 
payment and delivery innovations would appear to raise no antitrust problems. Nor would efforts on 
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the part of providers to improve the information flow about the care they are furnishing in order to 
make payments fairer and more aligned with quality and efficiency contradict antitrust law. 
Thus this policy brief focuses on those activities that can be pursued without running afoul of basic 
antitrust principles and also describes types of conduct that appear to venture into prohibited-conduct 
territory. Antitrust law is dense, complex and very fact-specific. Therefore it is not possible to give 
one-size-fits-all answers. For this reason, we follow the general principles set forth in the beginning of 
the brief with four case scenarios of efforts to advance greater information transparency. 
Background 
Public and private health insurers and employer-sponsored health plans have a high degree of interest 
in “value-based purchasing” innovations involving the use of provider performance data to assess 
quality and develop benefit, pricing and payment policies that reward high performance and 
incentivize improvements. 4 Extensive evidence shows high variability in costs and quality among U.S. 
health care markets. 5 Most markets contain thousands of individual health plan sponsors (e.g., public 
and private employers, Medicaid agencies and Medicare) who utilize multiple health benefit service 
companies to either insure or administer their plans. 
4 Miller HD, Creating Payment Systems to Accelerate Value-Driven Health Care: Issues and 
Options for Policy Reform, New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 2007, 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Publications/Fund-
Reports/2007/Sep/Creating-Payment-Systems-to-Accelerate-Value-Driven-Health-Care--
Issues-and-Options-for-Policy-Refor.aspx (accessed June 22, 2009); Robinson JC, 
“Slouching Toward Value-Based Health Care,” Health Affairs, 27(1): 11-12, 
January/February 2008; Tompkins C et al., “Measuring Outcomes and Efficiency in 
Medicare Value-Based Purchasing,” Health Affairs 28(2): 251-261, March/April 2009; 
Theory and Reality of Value-Based Purchasing: Lessons from the Pioneers, AHCPR 
Publication No. 98-0004, Rockville, MD: Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, 1997, 
http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/meyerrpt.htm (accessed June 22, 2009). 
5 Statement of Peter Orszag Before the Senate Finance Committee on the Overuse, 
Underuse, and Misuse of Health Care (June 17, 2008), 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/95xx/doc9567/07-17-HealthCare_Testimony.pdf (accessed 
June 22, 2009). 
Given the shared interest in raising quality and reducing costs, it makes sense for health plan 
sponsors, health insurers, providers, and others to collaborate on efforts to set common performance 
expectations, share information about actual health care performance, costs and pricing, and seek 
system-wide improvements in quality and efficiency. The concept of “value-based purchasing” has 
been a formal federal policy focus for several years, 6 and the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) has attempted to spur value-based purchasing interest. 7 Special payment 
initiatives incorporating episode-based payment concepts such as “evidence-informed case rates” also 
have been undertaken. 8 These types of payment experiments are designed to improve health care 
quality while simultaneously increasing the transparency of health care pricing information in order to 
increase efficiency. 9  
6 A Google search of “value-based purchasing” on the HHS website turns up several 
thousand separate hits with numerous documents regarding value-based purchasing and 
“how to” guides on the activity (Google search conducted March 25, 2009). The Agency for 
Health Care Research and Quality defines “value-based purchasing” as the act on the part 
of buyers of holding health care sellers “accountable for both cost and quality of care.” 
Thus, a value-based purchasing initiative would bring together “information on the quality 
of health care, including patient outcomes and health status, with data on the dollar outlays 
going towards health. It focuses on managing the use of the health care system to reduce 
inappropriate care and to identify and reward the best-performing providers. This strategy 
can be contrasted with more limited efforts to negotiate price discounts, which reduce costs 
but do little to ensure that quality of care is improved.” 
7 Evaluating the Impact of Value-Based Purchasing: A Guide for Purchasers, Table 1, AHRQ 
Publication No. 02-0029. Rockville, MD: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2002, 
http://www.ahrq.gov/about/cods/valuebased/vbptab1.htm (accessed June 22, 2009). 
8 Gosfield A, Making Prometheus Payment® Rates Real: Ya’ Gotta Start Somewhere, 
Princeton, NJ: The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 2008. 
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9 See e.g., The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation's Aligning Forces for Quality initiative, a 
long-term, comprehensive effort to lift the overall quality of health care in targeted 
communities, reduce racial and ethnic disparities, and provide models for national reform, 
http://www.rwjf.org/qualityequality/af4q (accessed June 22, 2009). 
Although the spotlight has been on payer-driven purchasing innovations, it is also important to stress 
that certain forms of value-based purchasing are proving attractive to provider groups, as the second 
issue brief in this series will show. This is because such a strategy might help foster changes in 
benefit, cost-sharing, and payment design that more appropriately aligns financing with high quality 
clinical care. 10 Thus, collaboration might include providers, plan sponsors, and companies that insure 
or administer plans. Antitrust law generally is not implicated when such conduct occurs within single, 
vertically integrated entities, although there are exceptions. 11 On the other hand, important antitrust 
issues may arise when the conduct involves collective action among competitors. 
10 Federal Trade Commission, In re Greater Rochester Independent Practice Association 
Advisory Opinion (2007), http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/industryguide/advisory.htm 
(accessed June 22, 2009). 
11 Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, 749 F. 2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984). But see Abraham 
v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 461 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2006) (illustrating that even 
single, vertically integrated entities can be subject to antitrust liability under Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act which extends the law's reach to unilateral conduct that results in a 
monopolization of any part of trade or commerce. While the court here did not impose 
antitrust liability under section 2 of the Sherman Act, the court's discussion describes the 
possible liabilities that vertically integrated entities face). 
In a nutshell, although antitrust law prohibits conduct among competitors that seeks to restrain trade, 
this prohibition certainly does not proscribe all interactions between competitors in a given market. 
Indeed, carefully crafted forums designed to promote value-based purchasing by providing quality 
information and technical support to the participants—even if competitors—is perfectly legal under 
antitrust law, as long as the participants do not collectively set uniform prices, fees, bonus amounts or 
other competitively sensitive terms. 
Thus, while competitors may choose not to collaborate (companies that administer and insure health 
plans are competitors and may not want to share what they consider to be proprietary information 
and trade secrets), antitrust law does not bar many helpful types of collaborations. The overarching 
aim of antitrust law is the advancement of free and open markets in which competition can flourish. 
To that end, payment initiatives and value-based purchasing innovations actually can promote 
competition by generating more transparent quality and pricing information in an effort to create a 
more efficient health care system and antitrust rules appear to allow such initiatives to happen. 
Indeed, it is probably safe to say that it may be impossible to realize high value in health care without 
some level of information comparison and collaboration. 
Over the years, Congress, federal and state antitrust enforcers, and the courts have considered 
whether special treatment or even exemptions under the antitrust laws are warranted for certain 
sectors of the economy where for various reasons it is thought that market competition might not lead 
to desirable results. While some advocates have sought special antitrust exemptions for health care 
providers, 12 Congress has resisted efforts to establish special antitrust rules in the health care sector. 
In the 1990s, however, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) (the two federal antitrust enforcement agencies), in an attempt to explain how they 
intended to enforce the antitrust laws in the health care sector, issued a series of Statements of 
Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care (Statements). 13  
12 Greaney T, “Whither Antitrust? The Uncertain Future of Competition Law in Health Care,” 
Health Affairs 21(2): 185-196, March/April 2009. 
13 Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, Washington: Federal Trade 
Commission and U.S. Department of Justice, 1996, 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/industryguide/policy/index.htm (accessed June 22, 
2009). 
The Statements do not modify classic antitrust principles. In fact, in recent years the federal 
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government has vigorously enforced the antitrust laws in the health care sector, particularly with 
respect to the supply side of the equation. These enforcement activities have taken the form of 
prosecuting physicians for jointly setting their prices in negotiations with health plans 14 or challenging 
hospital mergers that the agencies believed would reduce competition. 15 The federal government also 
has conducted extensive policy analyses examining the effects of limited competition on health care 
cost and quality. 16  
14 North Texas Specialty Physicians v. F.T.C, 528 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2008). 
15 Federal Trade Commission, In re Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation and 
ENH Medical Group, Inc. (File No. 011 0234, Docket No. 9315). 
16 A Dose of Competition, supra note 3, Washington: Federal Trade Commission and U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2004, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/health_care/204694.htm 
(accessed June 22, 2009). 
Given the expressed interest in using a growing body of health information to advance quality and 
efficiency in health care, one might think that group efforts to exchange and share information related 
to quality, price and efficiency would have received a blessing from antitrust enforcers. The FTC and 
DOJ staff have opined that information exchanges among providers detailing price and insurer 
reimbursement levels do not violate antitrust law if carefully crafted, 17 but there is no general, 
express provision in the 1996 Statements addressing the types of expanded collaborations that one 
might envision in an era in which the expanded use of health information has become a driving 
national policy goal. 18  
17 Federal Trade Commission, In re Medical Group Management Association Advisory 
Opinion (2003); Federal Trade Commission, In re PriMed Physicians Advisory Opinion 
(2003). http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/industryguide/advisory.htm (accessed June 22, 
2009). Department of Justice, In re Washington State Medical Association Business Review 
Letter (2002). http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/letters.htm (accessed June 22, 
2009). 
18 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), Public Law 111-5, 111th 
Cong., 1st sess. (2009). 
As a result, some health care purchasers may feel uncertain about the antitrust risks that arise if a 
group of buyers and sellers within one geographic region—or focusing on one particular health care 
product (e.g., hospital services)—collectively share and use the results of information to make health 
care purchasing decisions. Furthermore, to the extent such uncertainty is widespread, entities may be 
reluctant to engage in information-enabled buying and selling of health care. Some of the questions 
that arise include the following: What can entities that exchange health information do besides merely 
produce data for isolated use by individual payers and providers? Can these entities actually convene 
health care buyers and sellers to actively engage in value purchasing, that is, understanding and 
acting on pricing variation in relation to quality, testing new mechanisms for paying for health care, or 
sharing information about the results? 
It is important to note that in the current health care environment, different levels of health 
information exchange are taking place. These activities can range from the very basic exchange of 
information between an information entity and one or more participants in the exchange, to active 
efforts to affirmatively gather certain types of information among participants and examine the 
information for quality and cost, to efforts to use information to actually design new ways of paying for 
certain types of health care in order to achieve certain outcomes. 
Overview of Federal Antitrust Law and Actions Among Competitors 
Antitrust laws (the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act) 19 exist to 
safeguard free and open market competition both within geographic regions and in relation to certain 
types of products or services. The basic objective of antitrust law is to eliminate or prevent those 
practices that interfere with free competition. These laws are designed to benefit the consumer by 
encouraging vigorous competition in an environment in which business entities have the full 
opportunity to compete for consumers on the basis of quality, service and price. As noted above, the 
primary federal antitrust laws are the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade 
Commission Act; in the context of establishing innovative payment reform models, however, Section 1 
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of the Sherman Act is most relevant. 
19 15 U.S.C §1 (2009); 15 U.S.C §12 (2009); 15 U.S.C §45 (2009). 
The Sherman Act's Prohibition Against Agreements that Restrain Trade  
Section 1 states that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared illegal.” 
20 The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to render unlawful only those restraints of trade 
that unreasonably restrain competition, 21 and three elements are required for a violation: (1) the 
existence of a contract, combination, or conspiracy among two or more separate entities that (2) 
unreasonably restrains trade and (3) affects interstate or foreign commerce. 22 Because Section 1 of 
the Act does not prohibit independent action by a single entity regardless of its purpose or effect on 
competition, 23 an agreement between separate entities is essential to establish liability. 24 An 
agreement has been defined by the Supreme Court of the United States as “a unity of purpose or a 
common design and understanding, or a meeting of the minds in an unlawful arrangement,” 25 and 
such an illegal contract or conspiracy need not require any formal agreement but can be inferred from 
circumstantial evidence. 26  
20 15 USC §1 (2009). 
21 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 5 (1911).
 
22 Maric v. St. Agnes Hospital Corp., 65 F.3d 310, 313 (2nd Cir. 1995).
 
23 However, Section 2 of the Sherman Act and parts of the Clayton Act do reach and 
prohibit certain types of monopolistic practices by single entities, such as the willful 
acquisition or maintenance of monopoly or market power with the ability to control market 
prices or exclude competition in a given market. Conduct amounting to refusals to deal, 
agreements to foreclose competition, leveraging power in one market to gain power in 
another market, tying arrangements, and predatory pricing are examples of the types of 
behaviors that may violate antitrust law's monopoly prohibitions. 
24 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984); Copperweld Corp. 
v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-68 (1984). 
25 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946).
 
26 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
 
The most common antitrust violations result from “horizontal” arrangements that involve concerted or 
collusive activities by competitors in a given market, either product or geographic. Whether litigation 
is brought by the government or private litigants, a plaintiff must prove not only that the defendants 
are legally capable of conspiring (i.e., the alleged collusive activity did not occur between a parent 
company and its subsidiary), but also that they actually did so. In the absence of a formal agreement 
to collude, the Supreme Court has placed reasonable limitations on the range of permissible inferences 
from ambiguous evidence of an agreement or conspiracy. Thus, the relevant inquiry focuses on, 
among other things, whether the defendant had any rational motive to conspire, and whether the 
defendant's conduct was consistent with its own independent interest. 27  
27 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 
Thus, to the extent that separate competing health care entities—whether insurers, companies that 
administer health insurance products, or community providers—agree tacitly or otherwise to 
operationalize new payment models through provider participation contacts with network physicians, 
then Sherman Act Section 1 could be implicated. In the same vein, were competing providers to 
jointly agree to value-based purchasing bargaining strategies, that action may violate the Sherman 
Act. Indeed, it was concerted provider action related to the pricing of quality health care that led to 
the Supreme Court's seminal decision in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 28 in which the 
Court found pricing efforts among horizontal health care competitors, even where ostensibly linked to 
the advancement of health care quality goals, to constitute a per se violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. 
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28 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
 
Per se Versus Rule of Reason 
Once it has been determined that the defendants have the legal capacity to conspire and that an 
unlawful agreement exists, the effect of that agreement must be considered to determine whether it 
restrains competition unreasonably. The sharing of information about price and quality in and of itself 
is not the problem; it is what is done with the information. 
The courts generally use one of two methods to make this determination, depending on the nature of 
the agreement at issue. Certain categories of restraints, such as horizontal price-fixing, group 
boycotts, bid rigging, and market-allocation agreements are considered per se illegal. That means that 
these activities have been conclusively presumed to restrain competition unreasonably even without a 
study of the market in which they occurred, or an analysis of their actual effect on competition, or 
their purpose. 29 Antitrust cases are replete with examples of agreements that were determined to be 
price-fixing arrangements, such as establishing minimum or maximum prices, 30 creating pressure to 
increase prices, 31 stabilizing prices, 32 interfering with a competitor's freedom to make price changes 
independently, or establishing uniform terms of sale, discount policies, or otherwise establishing an 
agreed-upon approach to an underlying element of the price charged. 33  
29 ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments ch. I.B.3. (6th ed. 2007); 
Arizona v. Maricopa Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). 
30 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Goldfarb v. Virginia 
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
31 Minnesota v. Mid-West Minnesota Associated Physicians, 1991-1992 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
§69,531 (Douglas County Dist. Ct. July 2, 1991) (consent decree). 
32 United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
 
33 Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980); Vandervelde v. Put & Call 
Brokers Association, 344 F. Supp. 118, 136 (S.D.N.Y 1972). 
However, the prevailing standard for assessing the effect on competition of most categories of 
restraints is the rule of reason, which requires an analysis of the challenged restraint's effect on 
competition in a relevant market. 34 The rule of reason is applied in situations “where the economic 
impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious.” 35 Of course, defendants in antitrust actions 
would much prefer that in evaluating a claim, a court use a rule of reason analysis, as opposed to a 
per se analysis, because it gives the defendant the chance to justify its actions by offering facts that 
are viewed as demonstrating a pro-competitive effect as a result of the agreement. While some health 
care providers have argued that their pricing policies can only be judged under a rule of reason test 
because of the special considerations of quality and professionalism on which pricing rests, such 
assertions have been rejected by the courts, and “naked” price-fixing by physicians or other health 
care providers will be condemned as per se illegal. 
34 Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); NCAA v. Board of 
Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
35 FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
 
Yet, even under a rule of reason analysis, courts have prohibited information exchanges in industries 
whose structural characteristics indicate that exchanging price information is likely to have an 
anticompetitive effect. That is, courts can at some point view the exchange of information as 
suspicious in its own right, underscoring the need for further clarity and certainty in the field. Thus, an 
exchange of price information that is not part of a price-fixing scheme may be legal if its value for 
quality purposes (e.g., improving the quality of health care) outweighs any likely anticompetitive 
effects. At the same time, the very nature of a rule of reason analysis—a case by case review of the 
facts—suggests the inherent challenges in applying antitrust law to a fast-evolving field of health care. 
Of most concern for plan sponsors and companies that insure or administer plans that are engaged in 
the effort to develop new pricing models is the danger that these new models will be considered price-
fixing under the Sherman Act. As discussed above, price-fixing allegations are subject to a per se 
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unreasonable restraint analysis which offers the defense very little chance to defend its actions. For 
example, once a plaintiff can show that two or more managed care entities have agreed—either 
explicitly or implicitly—to implement a payment model with agreed-upon prices for provider services, 
it is likely that a court will view this as price-fixing, and impose liability under the per se rule. 
Therefore, understanding how to avoid a per se determination is critical. 
Avoiding Antitrust Liability 
Entities that exchange competitively-sensitive information can avoid per se antitrust liability in several 
ways. The doctrine known as “conscious parallelism,” the antitrust safety-zones in the FTC/DOJ 
statements, and the “state action” doctrine all provide specific defenses for certain types of 
information exchanges and are discussed below. 
“Conscious Parallelism” 
“Conscious parallelism” can provide a defense for entities that, while not actually agreeing on price, 
have engaged in an information exchange from which one could reasonably infer that a price 
agreement had been reached. The doctrine provides that a pattern of uniform business conduct 
among competitors does not, standing alone, run afoul of the antitrust laws. Parallel behavior by itself 
does not prove a conspiracy; plaintiffs must offer several “plus factors” in combination with conscious 
parallelism to prove an inference of coordinated action. These “plus factors” are often other facts and 
circumstances that support the claim that a conspiracy has occurred. 36  
36 Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Film Distribution Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954); 
Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2nd Cir. 2005). 
Thus if payers of health care services adopt new pricing models—even the exact same model—they 
might claim conscious parallelism without an antitrust violation. The crux of this defense will hinge on 
whether, in these multi-stakeholder collaborations to develop new pricing mechanisms, any meeting of 
the minds occurred with regard to actual implementation and roll-out related to the setting of price or 
other competitively-sensitive terms. Again, for this defense to work, there must be adequate 
safeguards built into the structure of the collaboration itself to assure that there is no agreement on 
price terms. Put another way, meeting to exchange information and gain knowledge about innovation 
is not the problem; using the information to then develop a joint approach to pricing is the issue. 
Antitrust Safety Zones 
The DOJ and FTC have addressed the issue of information exchanges among health care providers in 
their 1996 Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, and among horizontal 
competitors in general in their “Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors.” Through 
these documents, the agencies have recognized the pro-competitive potential of information 
exchanges, but also warn that such exchanges may in certain cases increase the likelihood of collusion 
on matters such as price, output, or other competitively sensitive variables. These statements create 
antitrust safety-zones for certain categories of information exchange, and conduct that falls within a 
safety-zone will avoid an agency finding of per se antitrust liability. Several statements are applicable 
here. 
Statement 4 addresses the government's “[e]nforcement policy on providers' collective provision of 
non-fee-related information to purchasers of health care services.” The antitrust safety zone provided 
by this Statement allows providers to collectively give to purchasers “underlying medical data that 
may improve purchasers' resolution of issues relating to the mode, quality, or efficiency of treatment.” 
The collection of outcome data from independent physicians about a particular procedure that the 
providers believe should be covered, and the provision of that information to purchasers, falls within 
the safety zone and is not a per se violation of antitrust law. In addition, the antitrust enforcement 
agencies will not challenge “providers' development of suggested practice parameters—standards for 
patient management developed to assist providers in clinical decision-making—that also may provide 
useful information to patients, providers, and purchasers.” The agencies believe that this type of 
concerted conduct by physicians poses little risk of restraining competition and in fact has the 
potential to increase quality and efficiency, thereby promoting competition. Statement 4 warns, 
however, that the safety-zone does not apply to the extent that this activity is used by providers to 
coerce purchasers' decision-making by threatening to boycott a plan that does not adhere to the 
providers' joint recommendation. 
Statement 5 addresses the government's “[e]nforcement policy on providers' collective provision of 
fee-related information to purchasers of health care services.” Regardless of the structure of the 
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provider organization, competing providers can collectively give payers information about price or 
other aspects of reimbursement—such as episode-of-care cost determinations—without raising 
significant antitrust implications. The agencies acknowledge that “such factual information can help 
purchasers efficiently develop reimbursement terms to be offered to providers and may be useful to a 
purchaser when provided in response to a request from the purchaser or at the initiative of the 
providers.” 37 The agencies provide a detailed antitrust safety zone for this type of scenario if 
providers satisfy the following conditions: (1) the pricing information is collected by a third-party; (2) 
while the payers can secure newer pricing data, any information that is shared among the providers 
must be at least three months old and the pricing data must reflect pricing data from at least five 
providers with no one provider's data representing more that 25 percent of that statistic; and (3) the 
information must be aggregated so that the recipients cannot identify the prices charged by any single 
physician. 38 Thus Statement 5 allows aggregated data sharing of price-relevant data by physicians 
collectively to purchasers, under certain limited conditions. 
37 U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Statements of Antitrust 
Enforcement Policy in Health Care (1996), Statement 5. 




Statement 6 addresses the government's “[e]nforcement policy on provider participation in exchanges 
of price and cost information.” Here, the antitrust enforcement agencies have created a safety-zone 
for “participation by competing providers in surveys of prices for health care services, or surveys of 
salaries, wages or benefits of personnel.” The agencies believe that this information can increase 
competition because providers can use this information to price their services more competitively, and 
purchasers can use the survey data to make informed decisions about what they will buy. Specifically, 
to fall within the safety-zone and thereby avoid per se antitrust liability, several elements must be 
present: (1) the survey is managed by a third party; (2) the information provided by survey 
participants is based on data more than 3 months old; and (3) there are at least five providers 
reporting data upon which each disseminated statistic is based, no individual provider's data 
represents more than 25 percent on a weighted basis of that statistic, and any information 
disseminated is sufficiently aggregated such that it would not allow recipients to identify the prices 
charged or compensation paid by any particular provider. 39 Statement 6 therefore allows, under 
certain circumstances, competing providers to share among themselves—or publish for public use—
specific provider price and cost information. 
39 U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Statements of Antitrust 
Enforcement Policy in Health Care (1996), Statement 6. 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/industryguide/policy/index.htm (accessed June 22, 
2009). 
Statement 8 addresses the government's “[e]nforcement policy on physician network joint ventures” 
and sets forth the circumstances under which physicians may collectively agree on price or price-
related terms and jointly market their services to purchasers. This Statement provides an antitrust 
safety-zone for such joint negotiation of price when the physician joint venture is sufficiently 
financially integrated (i.e. the member providers share significant financial risk). Moreover, Statement 
8 further explains that certain types of clinical integration, even when there is no sharing of financial 
risk among providers, may justify physician joint contracting with purchasers when the joint 
contracting is necessary to achieve pro-competitive efficiencies. 
While clinical integration does not have a specific safety-zone like the one created for financial 
integration, in a 2007 opinion involving the Greater Rochester Independent Practice Association (IPA), 
the FTC determined that despite the absence of financial risk, the integrated structure of the IPA, 
coupled with its proposal to incorporate evidence-based quality reporting and practice management 
into its structure, eliminated the need for assumption of financial risk. Likewise, in a 2009 opinion, the 
FTC did not challenge Tristate Health Partners' attempt to clinically integrate its 200 physician 
members and one hospital member in order to collectively negotiate contracts with payers because, in 
part, of the new entity's “potential to produce significant efficiencies, including both improved quality 
and more cost-effective care.” 40 These decisions and their effect on the creation and use of 
accountable care organizations are the focus of the second brief in this series. 
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40 Federal Trade Commission, In re TriState Health Partners, Inc. Advisory Opinion (2009), 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/industryguide/advisory.htm (accessed June 23, 2009). 
On the payer side, the agencies' “Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations among Competitors” are most 
applicable here. This document discusses the framework for evaluating agreements among 
competitors that might withstand antirust scrutiny, because the agreement is reasonably necessary to 
achieve pro-competitive benefits from an integration of economic activity. Here, the more factually 
driven rule of reason analysis would be employed to determine whether the pro-competitive benefits 
outweigh anticompetitive harms. The guidelines specifically mention several types of collaborative 
agreements that tend to limit independent decision-making or combine financial interests and thus 
harm competition: production collaborations, marketing collaborations, buying collaborations and 
research and development collaborations. At the same time, the fact that in-depth rule of reason 
analysis is appropriate in the agencies' view is extremely important in guiding payer actions. 41  
41 U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for 
Collaborations Among Competitors, §3.31(a). 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf (accessed June 23, 2009). 
The State Action Doctrine 
Under certain circumstances, defendants in federal antitrust cases can avoid liability under the 
doctrine of state action. Long ago the United States Supreme Court recognized the authority of the 
several states to adopt alternative competition regimes tailored to peculiar local conditions, and thus 
entities that adhere to these state regimes are immune from what otherwise would be considered 
illegal behavior under federal antitrust law. 42 This defense, however, comes with significant 
limitations. 
42 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
This so-called “Parker immunity” only applies when the challenged activity has been undertaken 
pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy, such as a law passed by the state legislature or a policy 
approved by the state supreme court. 43 However, a broad grant of statutory authority will not satisfy 
the clear articulation requirement unless the state clearly intended to displace competition. 44 On the 
other hand, a state statute expressly permitting collective rate-making, for example, did render the 
litigant's rate-making activities immune from the federal antitrust laws. 45  
43 Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985). 
44 Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 92 (1988); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. 
United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985). 
45 Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
 
The test to determine whether Parker immunity is a viable defense to an antitrust allegation contains 
two parts: the private party must prove that it was (1) acting pursuant to a clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed state policy and (2) that the state is engaged in the active supervision of the 
conduct. 46 This type of explicit, state-sanctioned activity with ongoing accountability essentially gives 
the imprimatur of state action to private conduct by regulating it. Not only must the law authorize the 
arrangement, but there also must be ongoing oversight of the process and the output of the conduct. 
47 Our review of state laws that could potentially provide some level of federal antitrust protection 
under the state action doctrine is discussed below. 
46 California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 
(1980). 
47 Id. at 105.
 
Specific Forms of State Action: Through laws (frequently developed at the state level, where health 
care quality regulation takes place) that address specific matters, such as health care quality 
improvement and reporting or licensure and certification of health care facilities and entities, the legal 
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system may grant specific antitrust immunity for certain types of conduct that would otherwise be 
considered anticompetitive. For example, state law may explicitly authorize collective bargaining, data 
sharing or referral agreements between providers, as shown in the chart below. Aside from specific 
antitrust exemptions stated in law, legal involvement in the area of health care pricing runs the gamut 
from merely allowing the publication of prices to actively restructuring payment systems. Many states 
have laws mandating or facilitating the exchange of information regarding the price health care 
providers charge for various services. 48 Price information for certain providers (usually hospitals) is 
collected by the state and used for analysis of health care spending trends. Sometimes this 
information is available to the public in its entirety, and in other cases, the state generates public 
reports showing average prices for certain services in the state or prices by facility for certain services. 
This level of state action, however, would not be sufficient to create Parker immunity. 
48 See Arizona Revised Stat. 36-125.05 (2009); California Health & Safety Code §1339.56 
(2009); Ohio Rev. Code §3727.12 (2009); South Dakota Codified Laws §34-12E-11 
(2009); 35 P.S. §§449.5-449.7 (2009); Utah Code §26-33a-104 (2009). 
In recognition of the need for health care cost control and improved efficiency, some states have 
established councils or commissions to collect and analyze price data and develop policies to improve 
cost effectiveness, such as quality and efficiency measures. Additionally, a handful of states are 
actively pursuing efforts to restructure health care payment systems by incentivizing payment 
structures that are more efficient or effective than others. This type of state action may help create 
antitrust immunity if the state clearly articulates a policy to displace market competition with 
regulation of health care prices and services and actively supervises the marketplace affected by its 
action. The chart below shows some state laws involving health care pricing. The reporting of charges 
tends to be the focus of these laws, rather than the reporting of actual contracted payment rates, 
which may be the greater focus of interest. At the same time, the laws underscore growing state 
interest in actual intervention to increase the provision of information. 
Level of State 
Action
State Law Activity
 Arizona Arizona 
Revised Stat. 
36-125.05
Requires uniform reporting system for all hospitals, 
outpatient surgical centers and emergency 
departments, including average charge per patient, 
average charge per physician and publication of 





California CA Health & 
Safety Code 
§1339.56
Requires hospitals to report prices for the top 25 
most common outpatient services or procedures.
 Ohio Ohio Rev. 
Code 
§3727.12
Requires reporting of hospital charges for the top 
100 diagnosis related groups (DRGs) and certain 
other procedures.






Hospitals must report charges for 25 most common 
inpatient DRGs, to be published online in 2009.
 Pennsylvania 35 P.S. 
§§449.5-
449.7
Requires the Health Care Cost Containment Council 
to develop a computerized system for the collection, 
analysis and dissemination of health care quality and 
cost information; to collect patient data (including 





of cost and 
efficiency 




H.B. 9 (2007) 
Health Data Committee instructed to “collect, 
analyze, and distribute health care data to facilitate 
the promotion and accessibility of quality and cost-
effective health care.” Committee instructed to 
develop plan to measure and compare costs of 
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State Action and Provider Collaboration: What if groups of health care providers were to work together 
to offer a “value package” to payers, acting under state supervision? A recent FTC advisory opinion to 
the Minnesota legislature regarding a piece of proposed Minnesota legislation aimed at exempting 
certain health care cooperatives from charges of price-fixing sheds some light on the types of laws 
that the FTC finds insufficient to find state action immunity. (Bear in mind, of course, that there has 
been no official judicial ruling on the state law). Senate Bill S.F. No. 203 would establish health care 
cooperatives to collectively negotiate on behalf of their members in order to promote rural health care 
delivery. The legislation, aimed at improving rural health care, requires certain health care 
cooperatives to operate under state supervision to assure that their contracts advance lawful interests. 
The bill provides for submission of contracts to the state for review and approval; failure to act or seek 
additional information on the part of the state results in approval, making the system potentially one 
of passive review. The bill provides that contracts are to be deemed lawful in the absence of findings 
by the state that the anticompetitive effects of the contract exceed pro-competitive effects or 
efficiencies, or that the price agreements are not necessary to achieve efficiencies. Therefore, the 
measure places the burden of proof on the state to find arrangements anticompetitive. 
In the view of the FTC, the Minnesota law “would deprive health care consumers of the protections of 
measures) (episodes of 
care)
episodes of care and authorized to collect data 
regarding fees, contract terms, reimbursement 
arrangements, etc.




Requires data collection and reporting of 
expenditures and creates a chronic care 
management program, which includes studying 
“payment methodologies to align reimbursements 
and create financial incentives and rewards for 
health care professionals to establish management 
systems for chronic conditions, to improve health 
outcomes, and to improve the quality of care, 












Massachusetts Senate, No. 
2863 (2008)
Commission will investigate reforming and 
restructuring the health care system and will 
recommend a plan for “the implementation of the 
common payment methodology across all public and 
private payers in the commonwealth.”
 Minnesota S.F.No. 3780 
(2008)
Payment system reform for both public and private 
sectors, including provider pricing for “baskets” of 
care, care coordination fees for medical homes, 













Provides that action pursuant to the chapter (re: 
cost-control measures, cooperative arrangements, 
effective health care delivery systems, etc.) to be 
exempt from state and federal antitrust laws; 
defines actions which will not be exempt.
 Nebraska R.R.S. Neb. 
§71-7709 
(2008)
Provides antitrust immunity to any party to a 
cooperative agreement approved by the department 






Exempts from state antitrust laws providers and 
purchasers acting subject to an approved 
cooperative agreement.
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the antitrust laws and the benefits of competition … If the bills … were to become law, all consumers—
patients, employers, insurers, and federal, state, and local health programs—likely would pay more for 
medical care.” 49 The FTC found that “like…other health care provider collective bargaining bills…” the 
measure is designed to confer authority on competitors to agree to “prices and other terms they will 
accept from health plans and to bargain jointly to obtain these collectively determined contract 
terms.” 50 The FTC determined that “although the bills set up a scheme for state review, the nature of 
that review is limited. Indeed, [the] bills effectively establish a presumption in favor of approval.” 51  
49 Federal Trade Commission, In re Minnesota House Bill H.F. No. 120 & Senate Bill S.F. 
No. 203 Advisory Opinion (March 18, 2009). 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/advocacy/V090003.pdf (accessed June 23, 2009). 




According to the FTC, under the bill, “as long as the applicant provides the information requested by 
the Commissioner, within a very limited time, the Commissioner must evaluate the potential 
competitive effects of the application, the potential efficiencies of the application, and determine which 
of these effects exceeds the other.” 52 Finding that this type of collective bargaining by providers does 
not serve the public interest and would likely raise health care costs, the FTC concluded that the 
measure was tantamount to state-sanctioned price-fixing and pointed to cost estimates prepared by 
the United States Congressional Budget Office, which found that similar federal measures would lead 
to higher private insurance premiums. 53 The FTC found inadequate state oversight given the limited 
time accorded to the state for review, as well as the presumption of legality built into the process. In 
other words, the type of active supervision that goes to the heart of the state action doctrine was 
missing in the view of the FTC (a court might, of course, find otherwise), not only because it was not 
expressly called for, but because the bill itself was structured to effectively prevent active oversight 
from happening. 
52 Id. 
53 Id., p. 8.
 
The FTC also determined that by encouraging higher prices, the measure would advance neither 
health care access nor quality, even though its ostensible purpose was to stabilize health care in rural 
areas. The FTC also noted that since antitrust law already allows collective action among horizontal 
competitors through the creation of integrated systems that (typically) bear risk and are empowered 
to act as an integrated unified entity, the bill was unnecessary to achieve legitimate aims. In other 
words, were providers to form a corporation to sell medical care products and to negotiate integrated 
delivery arrangements with payers, their conduct would be lawful (provided the entity lacked market 
power) without the need for state action. 
Whether a court would agree with the legal conclusions reached by the FTC is a matter of conjecture, 
and a court might conclude that the state's intervention was sufficiently strong to pass muster. In 
part, the FTC letter goes to the policy wisdom (or lack thereof) of granting a state action exemption, a 
matter that a legislature might well consider important, particularly in rural areas (or medically 
underserved urban areas for that matter) in which countervailing policy considerations regarding 
matters of access and stability and health care quality are particularly important. 
Four Case Scenarios 
It is evident that information sharing alone is not the culprit—the antitrust problems arise when 
competitors jointly use the information to attempt to control the price within a particular geographic or 
product market. Thus, entities that convene stakeholders, provide extensive information about historic 
cost and quality outcomes within the market, present information on innovations in health care 
organization and payment, educate and inform their members, and provide technical support to test 
payment and delivery innovations would appear to raise no antitrust problems. Nor would efforts on 
the part of providers to improve the information flow about the care they are furnishing in order to 
enable purchasers to make more informed buying decisions contradict antitrust law. We offer four 
hypothetical situations that illustrate possible collaborative activities. 
Scenario 1 
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A regional health care collaboration convenes several insurers and employer group health plan 
sponsors, as well as the medical society and hospital association in its service area. The purpose is to 
share (appropriately de-identified) information comparing the prices paid across the market for certain 
types of surgery, as well as readmission and health outcome data related to the surgery. The group 
also wants to discuss the potential to move toward a different payment structure for this type of 
surgery that would entail a single payment to health care facilities for surgery and aftercare as a 
means of reducing readmissions and improving health. The general outlines of “bundled” pricing are 
discussed and past successes or challenges are reviewed. At the same time, there is no exchange of 
information regarding how any particular insurer or plan in the room will in fact price the surgery and 
aftercare or whether the physicians in the room would agree to move to a modified aftercare payment 
system or how much they would charge. (Of course the hospitals and physicians may subsequently 
decide to come together to form a new integrated entity just for the purpose of managing the 
payment and practice associated with surgery and aftercare, but this is another matter.) 
Is this legal? It would appear to be. The exchange is merely convening and providing information and 
technical support for the stakeholders to act independently. The exchange is offering a key service by 
promoting value-based purchasing to encourage a new approach to covering and paying for surgery 
and aftercare. The outcome hopefully might be a bundled case rate that prices and pays for an 
integrated treatment approach over an entire episode of care. Payment would be based upon clinical 
practice evidence linked to heath care quality. Individual insurers and plans are free to adopt or not 
adopt the model. Individual providers are free to participate or not participate in the model. There 
may be general discussion of how payment is structured under this type of approach, but the insurers 
in the room are making no agreements, and neither are the physicians. If everyone agrees to move 
forward, the exchange might continue to work with the insurers, plans and providers to implement the 
changes and report back to the group about the results. 
Precisely because the antitrust-sensitive aspects of this endeavor—data collection, quality assessment, 
and setting of the case rate—would occur independently among the entities, the activities would not 
appear to implicate federal antitrust law. No state action doctrine needs to be invoked. Nor does 
antitrust law stop any of the stakeholders from making information about their own experiences 
public. 
Scenario 2 
Insurers and physicians, working with a collaborative in a given market, agree to test a “medical 
home” model of care that utilizes a specified approach to physician payment (e.g., the basic clinical 
fees plus a monthly care coordination fee for certain types of cases). The insurers agree that they will 
provide a “care coordination fee” to their network physicians and that they will send data on clinical 
care outcomes to the exchange for analysis. Everyone agrees on the outcomes over time they will 
monitor (reduced admission and emergency room use, stable or improved measures of health status, 
better adherence to certain treatment regimens, total costs, as well as the cost of each component of 
the model). The group agrees to pursue the effort for a year and use the exchange to collect and 
report on the results. Does this activity violate federal antitrust law? 
Again, this type of activity would not violate antitrust law because the agreement between the 
insurers stops short of collectively setting the fee or bonus amount. There is nothing illegal about 
horizontal competitors discussing and agreeing to try a general approach to improving the quality of 
care, the cost of care, and health outcomes. However, if the insurers want to use the same method to 
price and pay for the underlying care and case management fee, they would need to operate within an 
antitrust safety zone or pursuant to the state action doctrine. That is, the law would specifically govern 
the setting of the rate, the use of the rate to pay for the care, and oversight of the results. 
Scenario 3 
Three hospitals in a given market develop and publish standard definitions of billing codes for 
emergency care and urgent care provided in the emergency department, as well as guidance for 
hospitals on how to bill under those codes for different services. The local hospitals all agree to use 
these definitions to ensure that they are billing for their services appropriately and uniformly. Is this 
activity legal? 
Yes, this activity would appear to be lawful, since the purpose is to improve the quality and 
appropriateness of emergency room use by allowing hospitals and payers to more clearly understand 
and distinguish between health conditions that are judged following an initial examination to be true 
medical emergencies and those that can be more appropriately treated in alternative settings and that 
require a different payment structure and different incentives. This information may not only facilitate 
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more informed purchasing but, over time, can help shed light on serious health care access gaps, as 
hospitals, physicians, and insurers gain a better understanding of health care access and use patterns 
in the community. The hospitals essentially are collaborating to produce better information about 
health care in their community, which in turn, should allow for a more efficient payment structure. 
(Were the hospitals to use this information to bargain collectively as a group with insurers over what 
they should be paid, the conduct would likely be condemned as per se illegal absent a state action 
exemption whereby the state expressly sanctions and regulates the activity.) 
Scenario 4 
Five health insurers serving a specific community have come together to collaborate and establish a 
uniform set of practice guidelines and performance measures. For each practice, performance on a 
designated measure set is estimated using all patient data, regardless of payer. The health insurers all 
agree to use the guidelines and performance measures to make coverage determinations, and they 
agree to make incentive payments only to those practices that meet performance standards. The 
health insurers all agree on the amount of the incentive payments to be paid when the performance 
measurers are met. 
This level of joint conduct, in the absence of state action or a specific antitrust safe harbor, would 
appear to violate antitrust law, because there has been a meeting of the minds among the competing 
insurance companies regarding both the uniform coverage determinations based on satisfying the 
clinical guidelines, and the setting of the amount of the incentive payment to be made when the 
guidelines are followed. Where the focus is on common practice guidelines—rather than an agreement 
to only cover services that meet these common guidelines—by which quality will be measured, the 
activity remains one of quality improvement and should fall within the rule of reason. But at the point 
at which the quality measures start to be translated into payment structures, levels of payment, and 
collective coverage determinations, the activity moves into restricted territory because it is collective 
action to control the price of care. 
Conclusion 
The results of this analysis suggest that collaboration around key information exchange activities 
aimed at quality improvement, cost containment, and information transparency are all consistent with 
antitrust doctrine, whether undertaken with the formal guidance and support of an entity created 
specifically to undertake health information exchange or through more informal collaboration. 
At the same time, with the capacity to generate health information now growing at relative warp 
speed as the process of HIT adoption unfolds, this analysis suggests the potential need for an 
updating and expansion of the 1996 Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care. As 
useful as these statements are, they were drafted nearly 15 years ago, well before the transformation 
to an information-driven health care system got seriously under way. Now that the sharing and 
exchange of extensive information regarding cost and quality has become a serious and formal health 
system goal in its own right, an important consideration is whether to accompany this evolution in 
health information technology with an expanded list of scenarios and activities that either raise no 
antitrust problems or that can proceed either under a safety zone or through a state action doctrine 
exemption. 
In our view, enabling an appropriate interaction between antitrust law with the aims of an 
information-driven health care system merits attention in an era of national health reform. The U.S. 
health care system rests on basic concepts of competitive markets. At the same time, achieving 
greater value and efficiency in health care demands the ability to use and exchange information 
regarding price and quality within a variety of markets. Convincing competitors that it is not only 
desirable but legally safe to exchange information and work together to share and learn from 
information on price and quality may pose a challenge in the absence of clear safety zones permitting 
such conduct. While the state action doctrine may be of use in this regard, the very desire to keep 
health care competitive may defeat legislative efforts to bring greater transparency to quality and 
price within a health care market. For this reason, incentives, in the form of more explicit safety zones 
may produce progress. 
Advancing the actual use of health information is a goal that could be pursued through a 
comprehensive effort such as that undertaken in the development of the health care safety zones 
initially. Such an effort might entail the convening of experts in health care quality improvement and 
disparities reduction, cost containment, and health information, to create national goals regarding 
information creation, exchange, and access. These goals could, in turn, serve as the basis for a 
revision or expansion of the Statements to assure that the aims of more, better, and more transparent 
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information are reflected in the range of activities legally sanctioned under the Statements. Such an 
initiative would seem particularly germane, not only to the transformation of health care, but to 
vigorous and targeted antitrust enforcement policy. 54 The provision of transparent, comprehensive, 
and high quality information about how much health care costs and which types of health care appear 
to be valuable investments for society would appear to be worthy of incentives, and any doubts about 
the legality of producing and sharing such information—particularly when such information is made 
public—could be erased through the policy development process. 
54 Labaton S, “Administration Plans to Strengthen Antitrust Rules,” New York Times, 
Section A1, May 11, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/11/business/11antitrust.html?
scp=2&sq=antitrust&st=cse (accessed June 23, 2009). 
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